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Abstract
Indecisiveness and doubt are cognitive phenotypes of compulsive disorders, including obsessive–compulsive disorder.
Little is known regarding the cognitive mechanisms that drive these behaviours across a compulsivity spectrum. Here,
we used a sequential information gathering task to study indecisiveness in subjects with high and low obsessive-
compulsive scores. These subjects were selected from a large population-representative database, and matched for
intellectual and psychiatric factors. We show that high compulsive subjects sampled more information and performed
better when sampling was cost-free. When sampling was costly, both groups adapted ﬂexibly to reduce their
information gathering. Computational modelling revealed that increased information gathering behaviour could be
explained by higher decision thresholds that, in turn, were driven by a delayed emergence of impatience or urgency.
Our ﬁndings show that indecisiveness generalises to a compulsivity spectrum beyond frank clinical disorder, and this
behaviour can be explained within a decision-theoretic framework as arising from an augmented decision threshold
associated with an attenuated urgency signal.
Introduction
A tradeoff between certainty and the time spent on
option evaluation is a crucial, and non-trivial aspect of
decision making1–3. Spending too little time on an
important decision (e.g., whom to marry) can be highly
deleterious, as can spending too much time making
relatively unimportant decisions (e.g., where to buy
lunch).
Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)
appear to suffer the latter afﬂiction, and can be described
as both indecisive and intolerant of uncertainty4,5. Indeed,
many symptoms can be thought of in terms of extended
information gathering behaviour that is the complement
of OCD subjects’ need for certainty (e.g., checking that all
windows are closed). Despite a rich symptomatic
description in the literature there is a dearth of experi-
mental studies that decompose this behaviour. Most
studies support a link between OCD and increased
information gathering behaviour6–10, although not
unequivocally11–13. In a recent computational study, we
showed that adolescent patients with OCD express
increased information gathering due to an increased
decision threshold and altered subjective sampling costs7.
A fundamental problem in many clinical studies is the
observation that patients often suffer additional comor-
bidities, notably (sub-)clinical levels of depression and
anxiety as well as potential inﬂuences from current or past
medication. There is also concern in relation to the
explanatory utility of categorical psychiatric diagnoses14,15
that has led to a re-conceptualisation in terms of psy-
chiatric dimensions16. In this latter framework patients
with OCD represent those at an extreme of a compulsivity
spectrum while allowing for the presence of considerable
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compulsivity heterogeneity within an otherwise ‘healthy’
population.
We sought to examine whether excessive information
gathering behaviour was a marker of such a compulsivity
spectrum rather than simply the expression of a catego-
rical disease state. We recruited forty young adults from a
large population-representative sample from whom we
had collected psychiatric and other health-related infor-
mation. We followed a targeted recruitment approach, in
which we selected non-clinical subjects scoring either
high or low on an obsessive-compulsive symptom scale,
but matching these groups on other (psychiatric)
dimensions, such as mood, anxiety, age, gender, and
intellectual abilities. This allowed us to overcome limita-
tions in patient studies, such as those arising out of
comorbidities or medication usage. Using a sequential
information gathering task, we show that high compulsive
subjects express similar behavioural and computational
features as patients with OCD, consistent with the general




The goal of this study was to compare information
gathering in subjects who differed in obsessive-
compulsive symptoms (subsequently called ‘compulsiv-
ity’ for short, but this is not intended to imply an exclu-
sion of obsessions), but were comparable on other
psychiatric traits, in particular in relation to symptoms of
depression and anxiety. This is important because a high
comorbidity between OCD, depression and anxiety often
renders a dissociation difﬁcult for classic patient studies
[17]. We thus used a large population-representative
sample of young people in London and Cambridge (U-
CHANGE study; N= 2409; www.nspn.org.uk18–20), from
whom we had collected questionnaire and health-related
information. From this database, we recruited 20 adult
subjects with low (21.40± 2.52 years) and 20 adults with
high compulsivity scores (20.75± 2.34 years; group details
see Table 1). Importantly, the low compulsive subjects
were speciﬁcally selected so as to match the high com-
pulsives on anxiety and depression scores, which allowed
us to determine whether information gathering biases
were speciﬁc to variation in the compulsivity spectrum.
As an index of compulsivity, we used the total score of
the revised Padua Inventory questionnaire (PI-WSUR)21.
The PI-WSUR is an established questionnaire for asses-
sing obsessive-compulsive traits with a high test-retest
reliability and internal consistency21. The subjects with
high compulsive scores were in the 91.62± 5.83 percentile
of the U-CHANGE populations’ PI-WSUR distribution,
whereas the low compulsive group scored on the 27.29±
16.55 percentile of this distribution.
To match groups for depressive mood, we recruited
subjects based on the Mood and Feelings Questionnaire
(MFQ)22, which has a high internal consistency and can
be used as a screening for depression23. As a recruitment
measure of anxiety, we used the Revised Children’s
Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS)24, again known to have
Table 1 Subject characteristics
Low compulsive group High compulsive group
Age* 21.40 ± 2.52 20.75 ± 2.34 t(38) = .85, p = .403
Gender (f/m)* 13/7 14/6 χ(1) = .114, p = .736
Handedness (r/l) 16/4 16/4 χ(1) = .0, p = 1.00
IQ (WASI total) 115.6 ± 10.9 115.4 ± 9.8 t(38) = .06, p = .952
PI-WSUR total* 5.3 ± 4.0 50.2 ± 18.3 t(38) = 10.74, p < .001
MFQ* 19.1 ± 8.9 19.4 ± 11.7 t(38) = .07, p = .942
RCMAS total* 20.7 ± 10.1 18.7 ± 10.7 t(38) = −.61, p = .545
BDI-II total 6.1 ± 4.2 8.7 ± 7.1 t(38) = 1.41, p = .166
STAI (trait) 38.3 ± 6.5 41.4 ± 11.3 t(38) = 1.05, p = .302
STAI (state) 33.5 ± 6.1 34.0 ± 9.4 t(38) = .20, p = .843
BIS 58.30 ± 6.87 59.04 ± 9.74 t(38) = −.28, p = .782
Intolerance of uncertainty 48.75 ± 15.14 58.80 ± 15.87 t(38) = −2.05, p = .047
FMPS total 98.02 ± 16.21 103.02 ± 17.35 t(38) = −0.94, p = .353
Subjects were recruited from a population-based database so that groups differed maximally on the compulsivity spectrum (PI-WSUR)21, but were matched for age,
gender, depression (MFQ)22 and anxiety (RCMAS)24. The groups did not differ in depression (BDI-II)27, anxiety (STAI)26, impulsivity (BIS)28, handedness30 or intellectual
abilities (WASI)29, as assessed on the day of the experiment. Groups differed in their intolerance of uncertainty33, but not in perfectionism (FMPS)46. (mean ± SD); *data
used for recruiting participants
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good psychometric properties25. The recruited groups
scored on both questionnaires well within the normal
range of the population (MFQ: low compulsivity: 31.53±
13.64 percentile, high compulsivity: 30.13± 16.18;
RCMAS: low compulsivity: 31.63± 12.06, high compul-
sivity: 28.71± 14.47), thus not being either particularly
low or high in depressive and anxiety symptoms.
At the day of the assessment, we complemented these
measurements with additional questionnaires of anxiety
and depression that were speciﬁcally developed for >18
year olds, because both MFQ and RCMAS were primarily
validated in children and adolescents. We thus collected
the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)26 and Beck
Depression Inventory II (BDI-II)27. In addition, we col-
lected further measures, such as impulsivity (Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale, BIS)28, intelligence (matrix and
vocabulary subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence, WASI)29, and handedness30. The groups
differed in none of the measures (full details in Table 1),
ensuring that a difference in compulsivity is the key dis-
criminating feature between the groups.
Moreover, subjects were only recruited if they fulﬁlled
the following additional inclusion criteria: no neurological
or psychiatric diagnosis (self-reported screening ques-
tion), over 18 years, living in London, absence of colour
blindness. Data from these subjects has previously been
reported, investigating a different task collected on the
same occasion20. The study was approved by the UCL
research ethics committee (No. 6218/001) and all subjects
gave written informed consent. Subjects received mone-
tary compensation for their participation, but this did not
depend on the performance in the reported task.
Task
The subjects performed a paradigm based on the
‘information sampling task’7,11,31,32 (Fig. 1). In each game,
subjects saw 25 covered cards (depicted by gray squares).
Each of these cards could be uncovered using the
computer mouse, to reveal one of two colours. In every
game subjects were instructed to indicate whether they
considered the majority of cards to be blue or yellow (the
colours actually varied between games, the nomenclature
here is used for simplicity). They were allowed to uncover
as many cards as needed (a short delay of 250ms was
introduced between opening the tiles), without restriction
on the time spent on the task. Once they felt ‘certain
enough’ (detailed instructions are provided in Supple-
mentary Information) they indicated their ﬁnal decision
by selecting the respective colour. After their decision, a
short feedback screen (1000ms) provided information
about how many points were won (current and total
points), and the next game followed immediately. Subjects
had to open at least one card prior to deciding, but there
was no maximum, so that subjects were allowed to sample
all 25 cards possible before deciding.
We implemented two different reward schemes (the
order of presentation of the schemes was kept constant
across subjects). In the ﬁrst set of 10 games (‘ﬁxed’ con-
dition), subjects won or lost 100 points by declaring the
correct or incorrect colour, irrespective of the number of
cards they uncovered. Then, in the second set of 10 games
(‘decreasing’ condition), the potential win decreased as a
function of sampling. The potential win started at 250
points and decreased by 10 points for every card that was
uncovered (e.g., a correct decision after 4 opened cards
would provide 250-4*10= 210 points). Subjects lost 100
points for a wrong decision, irrespective of the number of
uncovered cards. Before the start of the ﬁxed condition,
subjects performed one practice game to familiarise
themselves with the task. Details about the sequences
shown are provided in the Supplementary Information.
Behavioural analysis
We analysed performance in this task using repeated-
measures ANOVAs with within-subject factor condition
(ﬁxed, decreasing) and between-subject factor group
Figure 1 Information gathering task. Subjects were asked to indicate whether the majority of the 25 covered cards (left panel) were of yellow or blue
colour. In each game, they were allowed to uncover as many cards as they wished (middle panels) by clicking on a covered card. When they had
decided they indicated their decision by selecting the respective colour (right panel)
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(high, low compulsives). These analyses were com-
plemented by independent-sample t-tests.
Based on previous ﬁndings that patients with OCD
sampled more in the ﬁxed condition and won more
points7, a priori we focused our analyses on performance
differences (esp. number of draws, points won) between
the groups in the ﬁxed condition. In addition, we explored
how information gathering in the ﬁxed condition was related
to a questionnaire-based report of intolerance of uncer-
tainty33 and whether this additionally explains information
gathering, over and above the compulsivity group. Effect size
metrics (partial eta-squared ηp
2, Cohen’s d) and 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals (CI) are reported where appropriate.
Computational modelling
To understand the cognitive processes that were driving
the behavioural differences, we ﬁtted a previously devel-
oped Bayesian computational model7,34. A description of
the model, the data ﬁtting procedure and model com-
parison can be found in the supplementary material. In
the best-ﬁtting model, subjects form a (Bayesian) belief
about which of the colours is more likely to form a
majority based on the cards they have unveiled so far (i.e.,
‘how likely is it that there are 13 or more yellow cards?’).
Subjects then use this belief to arbitrate whether to
sample more cards (non-deciding) or to decide in favour
of one of the two colours. This arbitration is formed by
computing state-action values (Q-values)35 that indicate
the worth of taking each possible action. The Q-values for
choosing the colours are computed based on the belief
about whether a particular colour forms a majority,
weighted by the outcomes of choosing the (in-)correct
colour. The Q-value for non-deciding consists of two
factors. One is the belief about how certain one will be if
one continues with sampling (i.e., weighted Q-values of
future states, computed using backwards induction). The
second factor is a subjective cost per step (or urgency
signal36–39) that promotes earlier decisions. The ultimate
arbitration between these three Q-values is determined by
a softmax choice rule40 with an additional lapse rate41.
In the model comparison (cf Supplementary Informa-
tion), we found that the subjective costs per step followed
a nonlinear, sigmoidal, function. This means the sub-
jective costs of sampling were small initially but increased
markedly as more information was gathered, similar to a
previously described urgency signal36. This process is
mainly controlled by an ‘impatience’ parameter p that
describes the stage at which these costs start escalating.
The model comparison also revealed that subjects did not
correctly represent the external costs in the decreasing
condition, leading to suboptimal oversampling in this
condition (cf Fig. 2, Supplementary Information). This is
why the winning model absorbs both external and inter-
nal costs in the urgency signal.
Model-based analyses
To examine the cognitive mechanisms behind the group
differences we ﬁtted a set of recently developed models to
each subject’s data (computational model is detailed
in Supplementary Information). Using the best ﬁtting
model (determined using Bayesian Information Criter-
ion), we then compared the model predictions between
the two groups. First, we compared decision thresholds so
as to formalize any variation in information gathering
behaviour. Decision thresholds are well known from
passive evidence accumulation models that use a ﬁxed
stopping rule42,43. At each stage of information gathering,
these thresholds characterise the mean difference in the
evidence for the two colours at which subjects are willing
to make a decision. In our task the threshold is inﬂuenced
by the ﬁniteness of the problem (i.e., that there are only
25 squares to sample and a majority of 13 cards is sufﬁ-
cient to be 100% certain) and the subjective cost of
sampling, which reduces the Q-values for non-deciding
(cf. Fig. S3). We used our computational model to com-
pute the decision thresholds, computed as the mean evi-
dence difference when a simulated agent (using the best-
ﬁtting subject-speciﬁc parameters) made a decision,
separated for each sampling stage. With this measure we
can assess how much evidence a (simulated) subject needs
at each stage39, but also examine how a decision criterion
might collapse as a function of sampling.
In our task, the collapsing decision threshold is driven
by two factors: the ﬁnite horizon of the task, and a sub-
jective urgency signal. The former factor is independent of
subjects’ preferences and captures the fact that as one gets
close to opening all cards, a smaller evidence difference is
needed to reach an absolute majority (i.e., 13 cards). The
second factor, which we term urgency, is based on the
observation that subjects express subjective costs of
sampling information and these costs escalate as sampling
proceeds. The stage when these costs escalate is deter-
mined by the impatience parameter p (midpoint of a
sigmoid cost function).
Group differences for decision thresholds and urgency
signals were assessed using a cluster-extent permutation
test (p< .05, height threshold t= 1, 1000 iterations)44.
To understand which aspects of the model were giving
rise to the observed differences, we compared model
parameters between groups using non-parametric Wil-
coxon rank-sum tests, focusing on the impatience para-
meter p in the ﬁxed condition, which our previous work
suggested was diagnostic for patients with OCD7.
Results
Increased information gathering and winnings in high
compulsive subjects
We ﬁrst asked whether subjects with high compulsive
scores sought more information before making decisions
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by comparing the number of cards they opened prior to a
decision. We found a main effect of group (F(1,38)=
10.15, p= .003, ηp
2= .211 Fig. 2a) showing that high
compulsives gathered more information before deciding,
relative to the low compulsive group. An additional
interaction effect (F(1,38)= 7.45, p= .010, ηp
2= .164)
demonstrates that the group difference was stronger in
the ﬁxed condition, in which no external cost for sampling
was imposed, as conﬁrmed by a signiﬁcant effect in this
condition (t(38)= 3.52, p= .001, d= 1.11, 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals CI: 2.1–7.9) but not in the decreasing
condition (t(38)= 1.28, p= .207, d= .40, CI: −.68−3.03)
in which costs were imposed. The effect in the ﬁxed
condition also remained when adding depression (BDI
total), anxiety (STAI trait and state) and IQ scores as
covariates (multiple regression analysis, t(34)= 3.26, p
= .003), thus ensuring that the difference was driven by
the compulsivity characteristics of the groups. We also
found that both groups gathered more information in the
ﬁxed condition than in the decreasing condition, evident
in a main effect of condition (F(1,38)= 65.38, p< .001,
ηp
2= 0.632).
We next asked whether this increased sampling beha-
viour had a beneﬁcial effect on outcomes, i.e. whether the
high compulsive group won more points. A signiﬁcant
group-by-condition interaction (F(1,38)= 7.00, p= .012,
ηp
2= .156, Fig. 2b), but no group main effect (F(1,38)
= .063, p= .803, ηp
2= .002) indicated that subjects with
high compulsivity scores won more points. However, this
was only the case in the ﬁxed condition, as conﬁrmed in a
direct comparison (ﬁxed condition: t(38)= 2.60, p= .013,
d= .82, CI: 37−302; decreasing condition: t(38)= 1.38, p
= .176, d= .44, CI: −65–343). Again, the effect in the
ﬁxed condition remained when controlling for anxiety,
depressive and IQ scores (t(34)= 2.71, p= .011). Addi-
tionally, a main effect of condition (F(1,38)= 39.93, p
< .001, ηp
2= .512) showed that both groups won more
points in the decreasing condition, as would an optimal
performing agent (cf. Fig. 2b).
To conﬁrm that improved winnings reﬂected increased
sampling, and not just less random behaviour, we exam-
ined whether subjects selected the colour that were more
plentiful at the time of the decision (here termed choice
consistency). Note that this does not directly translate
into whether the subjects chose the colour that formed
the overall majority, which in turn is directly reﬂected in
the subjects’ winnings. We found no evidence for a group
difference (F(1,38)= 1.78, p= .190, ηp
2= .045, Fig. 2c),
nor a condition (F(1,38)= .920, p= .344, ηp
2= .024) or
interaction effect (F(1,38)= .920, p= .344, ηp
2= .024).
This indicates similar levels of randomness in both
groups.
Independent effects of intolerance of uncertainty and
compulsivity on information gathering
On a symptom level, excessive information gathering
and indecisiveness have often been related to an intoler-
ance of uncertainty and a pervasive perfectionism, espe-
cially in the context of OCD5,45. We thus obtained the
subjects’ self-reported intolerance of uncertainty (IU
questionnaire33 total score) and perfectionism (Frost
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale total; FMPS46). We
observed a signiﬁcant group difference in their intolerance
of uncertainty (t(38)=−2.05, p= .047; Table 1), but not
in perfectionism (t(38)= -.94, p= .353; Table 1). To
assess whether IU and compulsivity independently
explained the increased information gathering behaviour
in the ﬁxed condition, we assessed their independent
contributions using a multiple regression. We found that
both compulsivity (t(37)= 2.80, p= .008) and self-
reported intolerance of uncertainty (t(37)= 2.30, p
= .027) predicted information gathering behaviour,
Figure 2 High compulsives sample more information when no external costs apply. a High compulsive subjects gather more information before
making a decision in the ﬁxed condition, where sampling came at no external costs. b This increased information gathering led to higher winnings in
the ﬁxed condition, with no difference evident in the decreasing condition. c Subjects did not differ in their choice consistency, i.e., whether they
picked the colour that was more plentiful at the time of choice. Computational modelling revealed that performance high compulsive subjects was
more similar to an optimal agent (green diamonds) in the ﬁxed condition, whereas in the decreasing condition, the low compulsive subjects were
slightly more optimal in turns of draws and points won. **p < .01, *p < .05
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independently of each other (Fig. S6). No other measure
(anxiety, depression, perfectionism, impulsivity, age, IQ)
correlated with information gathering in the ﬁxed con-
dition (all p’s> .2).
Information gathering along the compulsivity spectrum
Our ﬁnding of increased information gathering in the
ﬁxed condition in high compulsive subjects closely
resembles our previous ﬁnding in adolescent OCD
patients7. A key prediction of a conception of compul-
sivity as a dimension would be that information gathering
increases along the compulsivity spectrum, and where
OCD patients would express the most extreme informa-
tion gathering behaviour. We examined this prediction by
pooling the two studies (previous OCD study and present
study) and tested for a linear increase in information
gathering across groups (low compulsives< controls in
OCD study [not selected for low compulsivity] < high
compulsives <OCD patients). Here we found a highly
signiﬁcant effect of compulsivity group on information
gathering (Fig. 3, t(70)= 4.33, p< .001), supporting the
notion that information gathering is a general feature of a
compulsivity spectrum.
Increased decision threshold in high compulsives due to
altered subjective urgency in ﬁxed condition
To understand the mechanisms and processes likely to
drive the observed group difference in information gath-
ering, we used a Bayesian computational model. Model
comparison (Fig. S1) revealed that task behaviour of
subjects was best described if we assume an urgency
signal that rises in a nonlinearly manner during sampling
and promotes choosing, independently of current evi-
dence. This is implemented in our model in terms of
subjective costs of sampling that escalate from an initially
small value as sampling progresses, closely resembling
urgency signals proposed for perceptual decision
making36,37,47.
To formalize, and assess, how high and low compulsive
subjects differ in their model predictions, we computed
decision thresholds which reﬂected how much more evi-
dence for one colour is needed to make a decision at each
stage in the information sampling process (i.e., number of
opened yellow—blue cards). Using model simulations, we
found these thresholds collapsed over samples, in other
words subjects became more liberal and were content to
make a decision on weaker grounds. This collapse
occurred signiﬁcantly earlier for low compared to the high
compulsive group in the ﬁxed (Fig. 4a; p= .024, cluster-
extent correction), but not in the decreasing, condition (p
= .077, cluster-extent correction).
One of the key drivers of the collapsing decision
thresholds is an urgency signal, and in our model this is
cast as subjective costs per step. In the ﬁxed condition
there are no extrinsic cost, so this urgency reﬂects purely
intrinsic (energy, cognitive or time) costs for continuing
to sample. In the decreasing condition, the best-ﬁtting
model encompasses the externally applied costs within a
single term (see Supplementary Information for detailed
analyses of different costing models), which is why these
costs arise markedly earlier in the latter condition
(Fig. 4b).
When analysing this urgency signal we found that it
arose signiﬁcantly earlier in the low compared to the high
compulsive subjects in the ﬁxed condition (Fig. 4b; ﬁxed
condition: p= .004, cluster-extent correction; decreasing
condition: p= .212, cluster-extent correction).
Finally, we compared model parameters to probe group
differences in decision thresholds further. We found a
signiﬁcant difference in the impatience parameter p for
the ﬁxed condition (z(311)=−2.66, p= .008, Fig. S2),
similar to what we observed in a previous study of diag-
nosed patients with OCD7. This parameter is a key
determinant of when the urgency signal starts escalating.
We did not observe any difference for other model
parameters (cf. Fig. S2).
Discussion
Humans differ in how they negotiate speed-accuracy
tradeoffs48–50. In sequential information gathering
patients with OCD exhibit symptoms that can be con-
strued as a distortion of this speed-accuracy tradeoff due
to overweighting correct decisions6–13. Here we use
computational modelling of the behaviour of a carefully
curated sample of young people to demonstrate that
excessive information gathering is a deﬁning feature of an
obsessive-compulsive spectrum, going beyond the clinical
manifestation of OCD.
Figure 3 Information gathering as a marker for a compulsivity
spectrum. Pooling data from two studies with OCD patients and non-
clinical high compulsives conﬁrms a linear increase of information
gathering in the ﬁxed condition along compulsivity spectrum.
***p < .001
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A pervasive indecisiveness and intolerance of uncer-
tainty is seen as part of the core of OCD patients’
obsessions and compulsions4,51. Such symptoms can be
construed as an overweighting of the correctness of
decisions, and an excessive investment in information
gathering. Although such theories of compulsivity are
venerable52,53, behavioural analyses that test this idea are
relatively scarce. In this study, we extend previous
observations with OCD patients6–13 by showing that
subjects with high, but non-clinical, symptoms of com-
pulsivity exhibit a similar behavioural phenotype, albeit to
an attenuated degree. Thus, both patients and non-clinical
high compulsives manifest increased information gather-
ing behaviour when there is no external cost for sampling.
Notably this information gathering behaviour increased
monotonically along a compulsivity spectrum, suggesting
that increased information gathering generalises across a
spectrum of neurodiversity. This includes, but is not
conﬁned to, clinical disorder at its extreme end. Inter-
estingly, this increased sampling led to a better
performance for subjects with high compulsivity scores in
both studies, suggesting increased information gathering
can be task beneﬁcial (a feature rarely observed as con-
sequence of a psychiatric symptom). Indeed, the fact that
subjects with high compulsivity scores perform more
proﬁciently on this task raises interesting questions,
especially as indecisiveness is thought of as
incapacitating4,5,51.
We used computational modelling to probe the
underlying cognitive mechanisms and revealed that this
altered sampling behaviour in the ﬁxed condition was due
to an increased decision threshold in high compulsives or,
more exactly, a slower collapse of the decision threshold
across sampling. That is, the high compulsive group
used a more restrictive decision criterion for a longer
period. This slower collapse of a decision threshold was
captured in our model as a delayed emergence of a sub-
jective urgency to choose. Speciﬁcally, the impatience
parameter that governs the stage at which this urgency
grows most quickly is greater in high compulsive subjects,
Figure 4 Increased decision thresholds and delayed urgency signals in the high compulsive group in ﬁxed condition. a Decision thresholds indicate
the difference in evidence needed for making a decision. The thresholds collapse as a function of sampling, in line with an increasing urgency signal
found in perceptual decision making36, 39. Importantly, the decision threshold in the ﬁxed condition collapses signiﬁcantly earlier in the low
compulsive group, indicating that high compulsive subjects maintain a higher decision criterion for longer and consequently sample more
information before making a decision. Decision threshold differences in the decreasing condition did not reach signiﬁcance (lower panel). Green lines
indicates decision thresholds of an optimal model. The initial rise of the thresholds reﬂects the maximal evidence difference possible at this stage
(e.g., maximal evidence difference at Stage 2 is 2). b The urgency to choose, here cast as subjective costs for sampling, for the high compulsive group
escalates later in the ﬁxed condition. This is apparent in the ﬁxed condition (upper panel) from the 10th draw onwards, but not in the decreasing
condition (lower panel)
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in accordance with our previous ﬁnding in patients with
OCD7.
It is notable that high compulsives (as well as OCD
patients as shown previously7) all have collapsing decision
thresholds, with the onset of this collapse adapting with
external task demands (i.e., for the ﬁxed vs decreasing
condition). This suggests that an elevated decision
threshold is not an expression of cognitive inﬂexibility or
rigidity, i.e. an inability to adjust strategies to maximise
external rewards, but is the result of an arbitration
between an internal need for certainty, and other internal
and external demands, such as explicit sampling costs.
Indeed, we found a group effect for information sampling
in the ﬁxed condition alone, and not in the decreasing
condition (although differences in the reward structures
in the two tasks that could also have contributed to this).
The observation that high compulsive subjects had a
lower reward rate (number of points per unit time,
cf. Supplementary Information for analyses) than low
compulsive subjects in the decreasing condition might
suggest they were not as sensitive to this implicit metric.
However, this reward rate did not differ between groups
in the ﬁxed condition. Thus although high compulsive
subjects won more points overall, they did not win more
points per unit time. This favours an interpretations that
compulsive subjects solve a speed-accuracy tradeoff dif-
ferently, favouring accuracy when there is no explicit costs
for extended elaborations.
Considerations of the rate of reward prompt speculation
as to whether the urgency signal is more directly linked to
the time that has passed, the effort that has so far been
exerted54, or to the amount of information that has been
obtained. As for most other sampling tasks, we lack the
sensitivity to distinguish between these linked options.
However, teasing these factors apart in future studies
could shed light on whether the impatience that we
observe is due to a perceived waste of sampling-time, a
cognitive capacity issue due to an overwhelming amount
of information, or some other additional factors.
Urgency signals to promote liberal decision making as a
function of sampling have previously been described in
perceptual decision making36,38. These signals are
assumed to arise nonlinearly37,47, as we found, and to
modulate evidence accumulation in the brain36,38,39.
Given the relevance in compulsivity, it is interesting to
make conjectures about the neural origins of this signal.
One of the key areas described to modulate decision
thresholds is the subthalamic nucleus (STN)55–58, which
has been found to be compromised in OCD59 and is a
common target for deep brain stimulation in refractory
OCD patients60,61. It is assumed that the STN closely
communicates with areas of the medial prefrontal
wall55,62,63, such as the anterior cingulate cortex, which
also has been found to be impaired in structure and
function64,65 and is another target area for OCD
neurosurgery66.
It is interesting to conjecture how increased information
gathering is related to other neurocognitive mechan-
isms that have been found as impaired in compulsivity,
such as an excessive habitual behaviour16,67. It is possible
that cognitive features such as inﬂexibility or a dominance
of habitual modes of behaviour describe separate neuro-
cognitive subtypes that express in similar compulsive
symptoms. Alternatively, these features may arise at
different stages in the evolution of what is often a
chr
onic disorder, and where our ﬁndings pertain to an early
phase as seen in our adolescent and young adult samples.
In our study, we observed that increased information
gathering in the ﬁxed condition did not load solely on one
of the obsessive-compulsive subscales (cf. Supplementary
Information). Rather, it loaded to some degree on most of
the PI-WSUR subscales. This supports the notion that
information gathering is not portraying a subtype on a
symptom level (e.g., only compulsions or obsessions), but
rather depicts a speciﬁc neurocognitive phenotype.
In this study, we used a targeted recruitment approach,
where we carefully selected 40 subjects from a large
population-based study. With a sample of 20 subjects per
group, the group size was relatively modest and this was
partly determined by our very selective recruitment and
matching approach. We recruited subjects on the basis
that they scored either high or low on a compulsivity
spectrum, but who were otherwise matched on psychia-
tric dimensions such as anxiety or depression. This
allowed us to study compulsivity independently of other,
potentially confounding psychiatric traits and thus
enabled us to attribute excessive information gathering
more directly to compulsivity. Although modest in size
our sample size is in line with previous patient studies that
reported similar sample7–11 and relatively large effect
sizes7,10.
Our study provides evidence for increased information
gathering in conditions with no external costs, behaviour
that is characteristic of a compulsivity spectrum, and that
is seen in both non-clinical high compulsive subjects as
well as in patients with OCD. This behaviour is driven by
elevated decision thresholds and a slower emergence of an
urgency to respond. By recruiting from a population-
based sample we control for potential confounders, such
as other psychiatric dimensions, age or intellectual abil-
ities. The ﬁndings lead us to propose that compulsivity is
a phenotypic spectrum that is characterised by an
increased need for certainty.
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